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BANKRUPrCY
C.L T. FinancialServices, Inc. v. Posta, 866 F.2d 364
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, C.I.T. Financial Services, Inc. ("C.I.T."), appealed the dismissal of its complaint objecting to the discharge in bankruptcy of defendant, Posta's debt, which was secured by a mobile travel trailor.
C.I.T. argued that Posta acted maliciously in selling the trailor in violation of the terms of the security agreement. Consequently, 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) (1978) was applied, which excepts from discharge any debt
"for.. .malicious injury by the debtor...," including conversion of property subject to a creditor's security interest.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the bankruptcy court
and the district court. The court reasoned that because Posta did not
read the security agreement, they did not have any knowledge of C.I.T.'s
rights and, therefore, did not establish malicious intent. The court held
that because Posta did not knowingly violate C.I.T.'s rights by selling
the trailor, the conversion was not "malicious."
Fidelity Savings & Investment Co. v. New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172
Per Curiam
In a bankruptcy action, plaintiff, Fidelity Savings & Investment
Company ("Fidelity"), sought to recover distributions made on savings
certificates from the defendants, New Hope Baptist ("New Hope"),
claiming that the distributions qualified as preferences under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b). New Hope asserted that the distributions were protected as
transfers made in the ordinary course of business under section
547(c)(2). The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of
New Hope and the district court, sitting as an appellate court in bankruptcy, affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit rejected Fidelity's argument that the ordinary
course of business exception protected only short-term trade credit payments. The statutory language contains no express limitation, and the
legislative history of section 547(c)(2) indicates that a broader application was intended. The court held that the payments to New Hope were
a necessary part of Fidelity's daily business and, therefore, met the requirements for the ordinary course of business exception. The court affirmed the district court's judgment.
Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiffs filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. United States trustee, Vance, moved to dismiss asserting
that the plaintiffs' reorganization plan was deficient. The bankruptcy
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court, relying on 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(2)-(4), dismissed the case with
prejudice, and the district court affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that a bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 11 case if the debtor is unable to effectuate a plan, meaning that the
debtor lacks the ability either to formulate a plan or to carry one out.
The bankruptcy court correctly held that Hall was unable to formulate a
plan. The court further held that dismissal with prejudice is a severe
sanction to which the courts should resort infrequently. Because plaintiffs were appearingpro se, their tardiness in filing reports did not rise to
the level of bad faith necessary to warrant dismissal with prejudice. The
case was remanded to the bankruptcy court for the entry of an order
vacating the dismissal with prejudice.
Holmes v. Silver Wings Aviation, Inc., 881 F.2d 939
Author: Judge McKay
Debtors appealed from the district court's order, affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court to award creditor, Silver Wings Aviation,
Inc. ("Silver Wings"), attorney fees as an administrative expense.
The Tenth Circuit found that the former rule of appellate standing
embodied in section 39(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C.
§ 67(c) (repealed 1978), still applies to all appeals from bankruptcy
court proceedings. This rule limits the right to appellate review to those
persons whose rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by a bankruptcy court order. Since the order awarding attorney
fees to Silver Wings did not affect the total payout the debtors agreed to
under their Chapter 13 plan, the court dismissed the appeal, holding
that the debtors lacked standing to contest the award of attorney fees.
In re Allen, 888 F.2d 1299
Author: Judge Seth
Plaintiff, Spears, trustee of the debtor in bankruptcy, appealed the
judgment of the district court affirming the bankruptcy court's decision
to grant summary judgment to the defendant, Michigan National Bank
("National"). At issue was whether Spears could avoid a preferential
transfer of the debtor's interest under a Purchase and Escrow Agreement ("Agreement") pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower courts, holding that the
debtor's interest in the Agreement was a "general intangible," and that
National had properly perfected its security interest in the Agreement
under Oklahoma law. In the alternative, the conveyance from the debtor
to National met the "contemporaneous exchange" exception to Section
547(c) as found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c).
In re First CapitalMortgage Loan Corp., 872 F.2d 335
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Research-Planning, Inc., appealed from an order of the
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district court affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of its complaint.
Funds, which were originally held in trust by First Capital Mortgage
Loan Corporation ("First Capital"), pending a real estate transaction
between Research-Planning and a third party, were placed in First Capital's general account in violation of an escrow agreement with ResearchPlanning. The funds were then used to cover pre-existing debts, before
First Capital declared bankruptcy. Defendant, Segal, trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of First Capital, recovered a portion of these funds,
which were placed in First Capital's estate under the bankruptcy laws.
The Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy and district courts' disposition of the case was in error. The court found that the district court
erred in assuming that a metamorphosis occurred as possession of the
funds was transferred. Research-Planning was not divested of ownership
of the funds simply because the funds were transferred to cover preexisting debts. The court stated that the trustee in bankruptcy held the
funds not as part of the estate but for the benefit of Research-Planning.
In re Heape, 886 F.2d 280
Per Curiam
Under 11 U.S.C. § 522, debtors may avoid having a lien put on their
property if such property is considered a "tool of the trade." The bankruptcy court held that debtors' breeding stock did not qualify for lien
avoidance under the statute and the district court affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that breeding stock to a livestock farmer is indeed a "tool of the trade," as a means to produce agricultural products. The court favored the "use" test long employed by
the state of Kansas: tools of the trade must be used for the purpose of
carrying on the trade or business. The court noted that since the term
was neither defined in the statute itself nor in its legislative history,
courts have been inconsistent in their interpretations, but Tenth Circuit
case law has followed a practical application of the statute.
In re Leonard, 866 F.2d 335
Author: Judge Brorby
Debtors, Leonard and Weiss, sought to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest that creditor, Aetna Finance Company
("Aetna"), held in their property. Both filed a motion pursuant to the
lien avoidance provision of the Bankruptcy Code asking that their property be exempt from Aetna's lien. The district court held for Leonard
and Weiss stating that both could avoid the lien. Aetna appealed, arguing that when Colorado limited the types of property that could be exempted, the use of state law was mandated, thereby precluding use of
the federal lien avoidance provision.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision holding that
states may not "opt out" of the lien avoidance provision simply by limiting exemptions to unencumbered property. Furthermore, the court
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stated that since the property fell under Colorado's list of exemptions,
then any nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien on the property could
be avoided under the federal provision.
In re Mueller, 867 F.2d 568
Author: Judge Moore
The bankruptcy court denied Mueller a personal exemption for the
value of a life insurance policy he purchased immediately prior to filing
bankruptcy. Mueller appealed the district court order which held that
Mueller purchased the policy to defraud his creditors.
The Tenth Circuit held that the value of Mueller's life insurance
policy was not exempt from creditor's claims because Mueller filed
bankruptcy within one year after the policy was issued, and had obtained
the policy for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. The court further
held that the district court correctly applied the "badges of fraud" test
in determining whether Mueller purchased the life insurance policy with
intent to defraud. The order was affirmed.
In re Rasmussen, 888 F.2d 703
Per Curiam
Debtor, Rasmussen, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and all his unsecured debts were discharged except his debt to Pioneer Bank of Longmont. This exception was made because Rasmussen obtained the loan
from Pioneer through fraud. Rasmussen then filed a reorganization plan
under Chapter 13 to pay Pioneer 1.5% of the amount due, over a three
year period. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan and the district
court affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit de novo reviewed the legal conclusions of the
lower courts on appeal. The court stated that Rasmussen's successive
filings did not, by itself, constitute bad faith in the Chapter 13 filing.
When judged by the "totality of the circumstances," however, the court
found the Chapter 13 filing was not made in good faith. The court reversed the district court and dismissed the debtor's Chapter 13 reorganization plan.
In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc., 877 F.2d 32
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc. ("Robinson"), paid defendant, U.P.G., Inc. ("U.P.G."), $40,000 during the ninety-day preference
period prior to bankruptcy. U.P.G. accepted the money as payment in
full for a $49,000 debt, and released valid liens totalling $7,884.97.
Lowery, trustee in bankruptcy for Robinson, brought an action to recover a portion of the sum paid by Robinson as a preference under federal statute. U.P.G. claimed a complete defense to the preference action
under federal law which provided, "a transfer which is a contemporaneous exchange for new value is not avoidable as a preference."
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The Tenth Circuit stated that transfers are protected only to the
extent that they are contemporaneous exchange for new value. New
Value is defined as, "money or money's worth in goods, services, or new
credit." Outside the $7,884.97 in released liens, U.P.G. failed to show
anything qualifying as new value. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held,
only the $7,884.97 was protected by federal statute, and the remaining
$32,115.03 must be treated as preference and thus forfeited by U.P.G.
in re Sweetwater, 884 F.2d 1323
Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Pursuant to defendant, Sweetwater's, Chapter 11 reorganization,
plaintiff, Robison, was named trustee of a fund responsible for paying
Sweetwater's administrative claimants. Robison brought an avoidance
action under 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(B) (1978). The district court dismissed Robison's claim despite a finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction. Robison appealed the dismissal and co-defendant, Citicorp,
Inc., cross-appealed the jurisdictional finding.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling onjuridiction,
holding that the district court's determination was thorough and proper.
The court reversed the dismissal of Robison's complaint, finding that
the district court erred in determining that Robison did not qualify as a
"representative" under section 1123(b)(3)(B). Robison had been properly appointed and his responsibilities and authority under the plan further qualified him as a representative. Additionally, the plan specifically
allowed Robison to enforce avoidance claims. Finally, carrying out the
effect of the plan would further the efficient and fair administration of
the Chapter 11 proceeding.
Lowry Federal Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543
Author: Judge Moore
Debtors ("West"), filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against defendant, Lowry Federal' Credit Union
("Lowry"), to determine whether Lowry could legally repossess their vehicle. Lowry claimed it had a right to repossess the vehicle since West
failed to reaffirm the debt or redeem the collateral after filing for relief
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court held for
West, and Lowry subsequently appealed.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that West's failure to fie the notice of
election, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A), did not give Lowry, a
secured creditor, an automatic right to repossess collateral. Second, the
court held that section 521 does not state that redemption or reaffirmation is the exclusive means by which a bankruptcy court can allow a
debtor to retain secured property. Because the debtors were current on
their payments and maintained adequate insurance on the vehicle, the
court found that neither West nor Lowry were prejudiced. Thus, the
court conduded that the bankruptcy court acted within its discretion by
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allowing West to retain the collateral without requiring a redemption or
reaffirmation.
Porter v. Yukon NationalBank, 866 F.2d 355
Author: Judge Moore
Debtor, Porter, transferred certain property to creditor, Yukon National Bank ("Yukon"), to collateralize a preexisting debt. Subsequently,
Porter's trustee filed an action pursuant to section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to recover the transferred property for the benefit of the
estate. The district court voided the transfer and Yukon appealed.
Yukon claimed that the trustee failed to satisfy two Bankruptcy Code
requirements: Porter was not insolvent at the time of the transfer, and
the transfer would not have enabled Yukon to receive more than it
would have received under Porter's Chapter 7 liquidation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, stating that
Porter's insolvency was shown and it was unnecessary to introduce expert testimony. Instead, any appropriate means would suffice. Also, the
court stated that Porter's transfer had the effect of changing Yukon's
status from an unsecured creditor to that of a fully secured creditor.
This change of status to a preferred creditor would enable Yukon to
receive more money than it would have received under Chapter 7
liquidation.
Reiss v. Hagmann, 881 F.2d 890
Author: Judge Logan
Plaintiff, Reiss, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, listing one
creditor, the Bank of Woodward. The bankruptcy trustee sought court
approval for a compromise settlement to which the bank objected and
offered to pay litigation costs. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and the district court affirmed. The bank appealed, arguing that
the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion.
The Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had abused its
discretion in approving the compromise settlement because it failed to
make an informed decision based on an objective evaluation of the situation before it. Neither the trustee nor the courts did any legal research
or attempted to separate the issues and evaluate the facts. The court
further held that where there would have been no cost to the estate and
nothing to pay creditors without success of the lawsuit, the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion in approving a settlement objected to by the
sole creditor. The court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Sylvester v. Sylvester, 865 F.2d 1164
Per Curiam
Debtor plaintiff, Wendell Sylvester ("Wendell"), brought an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of certain obligations
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owed to his former spouse, Jane Sylvester ("Jane"), pursuant to a divorce settlement. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's determination that Wendell's monthly payments were "alimony" or
"maintenance." Consequently, the district court held that the payments
were not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the intent of the parties at
the time they entered into their agreement is determinative of dischargeability under § 523(a). The court stated that the Sylvesters' agreement indicated an intent that the payments be considered alimony,
maintenance or support. There was no intent that the payments be considered a property settlement. The court also upheld the district court's
refusal to analyze Jane's present need for support in order to determine
dischargeability of obligations.
Yukon Self Storage Fund v. Green, 876 F.2d 854
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, Yukon Self Storage Fund ("Yukon"), filed a complaint to
determine whether a debt was dischargeable. The district court affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss the complaint as untimely.
Yukon appealed, asserting that the district court erred in dismissing the
complaint. Yukon reasoned that it did not receive formal notice.
The Tenth Circuit held that a creditor who does not receive formal
notice of a petition for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7, but who had
actual notice shortly after the filing, is bound by the bar date for filing
complaints. The language of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A), allows the debt
owing to a creditor to be discharged if the creditor has actual, timely
notice, notwithstanding the failure of formal notice. When a creditor receives notice of a bar date with sufficient time to act, the requirement of
due process is satisfied. The court affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.

